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TORT LAW-WRONGFUL BIRTH-ExPANDING DAMAGES IN 
WRONGFUL BIRTH TORT ACTIONs-Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 
404 A.2d 8 (1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Thirty-eight year old Shirley Berman was under the care of 
Drs.. Ronald Allan and Michael Attardi during her pregnancy 
in 1974. 1 Medical studies show that women have a significantly 
greater chance of bearing a child with Down's syndrome (mongo­
lism) when they are over thirty-five years old. 2 Berman's doctors 
never informed her of this grave risk. They also did not apprise her 
of amniocentesis which is a procedure that involves the insertion of 
a long needle into the mother's uterus to withdraw a sample of am­
niotic fluid. This fluid is then analyzed; and the sex of the fetus, in 
addition to the existence of any genetic defects such as Down's 
syndrome, can. be determined. 3 This procedure is highly reliable in 
predicting genetic defects with little risk to the mother or fetus. 4 
In 1974, Berman gave birth to a daughter, Sharon, who was 
affiicted with Down's syndrome. 5 The Bermans, previously excited 
about the prospects of raising a normal, healthy child, were pre­
pared neither emotionally nor financially to rear a mongoloid child. 
They maintained that had they been informed of the high prob­
ability of bearing a mongoloid child and the availability of 
amniocentesis, Mrs. Berman would have undergone such testing. 6 
If the results of the amniocentesis had revealed a fetus affiicted 
with Down's syndrome, the Bermans contended that they would 
have aborted the child. 7 
The Bermans sued the doctors for malpractice in connection 
with the birth of their mongoloid daughter. They brought a w~ong­
ful birth action for damages they suffered due to Sharon's birth. 8 In 
Berman v. Allan,9 they alleged that the doctors were negligent for 
L Berman v. Allan, SO N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). 
2. Lappe, Can Eugenic Policy Be Just?, in THE PREVENTION OF GENETIC DIS­
EASE AND MENTAL RETARDATION 456,462 (A. Milunsky ed. 1975). 
3. Berman v. Allan, SO N.J. 421, 424, 404 A.2d S, 10 (1979). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10. 
7. Id. 
S. Id. at 423, 404 A.2d at 10. The Bermans also brought a wrongful life action 
on behalf of Sharon which will not be discussed in this casenote. The tort of wrong­
ful life is brought by the parents on behalf of the child to recover damages the child 
has suffered due to being born as opposed to not being born. 
9. SO N.J. 421, 404 A.2d S (1979). 
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not informing Mrs. Berman about the risks of bearing a child with 
Down's syndrome, and for not informing her about the availability 
of amniocentesis. 1o They also alleged that the doctors' negligence 
was the proximate cause of her bearing Sharon since Mrs. Berman 
was denied her right to decide knowingly whether or not to obtain 
an abortion. Consequently, she was injured by the birth of a 
daughter afflicted with mongolism. ll The parents sought damages 
for raising and educating their child, Sharon, and compensation for 
present and future mental and emotional anguish as a result of giv­
ing birth to a mongoloid child. 12 
The trial court granted summary judgment for the doctors.13 
Its decision was based on Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 14 the only previ­
ously decided wrongful birth case before the New Jersey Supreme 
Court. In Gleitman, the supreme court held that wrongful birth 
was not a legally valid claim for relief. The court stated that no 
damages cognizable at law resulted if a doctor negligently pre­
vented a mother from obtaining an abortion of a child subsequently 
born with birth defects. The court also said that even if damages 
were cognizable, recovery would be precluded because of the pub­
lic policy against abortion. 1s 
The Bermans appealed to the New Jersey Superior Court, Ap­
pellate Division; but before the appeal was heard, it was directly 
certified to the New Jersey Supreme Court on the supreme court's 
own motion. 16 Since the trial court ruled for the doctors on a mo­
tion for summary judgment, the supreme court accepted the Ber­
mans' allegations as true for purposes of the appeal. 17 
In a unanimous decision in Berman, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court rejected its position in Gleitman and recognized wrongful 
birth as a valid cause of action. 18 The Berman court remanded the 
case with regard to the wrongful birth action with the finding that 
only mental and emotional anguish damages were recoverable if 
the Bermans' allegations could be proven. 19 
In Berman, the court found that if the doctors were negligent 
10. [d. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10. 
11. [d. at 430-31,404 A.2d at 13. 
12. [d. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13. 
13. [d. at 425, 404 A.2d at 11. 
14. 49 N.J. 22,227 A.2d 689 (1967). 
15. [d. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. 
16. 80 N.J. at 425, 404 A.2d at 11. 
17. [d. at 426, 404 A.2d at 11. 
18. [d. at 432,404 A.2d at 14. 
19. [d. at 434,404 A.2d at 15. 
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in not advising Berman of amniocentesis, then they had to be lia­
ble for the consequences. Otherwise, a woman would have been 
denied her constitutional right to choose an abortion without any 
recourse against the doctors.20 The court found this result man­
dated by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. 
Wade,21 which established a woman's constitutional right to obtain 
an abortion. 22 
The Berman court stated that if the doctors' negligence had in 
fact denied the Bermans' right to abort the chil<l, and thereby to 
reject a parental relationship with Sharon, then the parents had 
suffered compensable mental and emotional anguish when they 
learned that Sharon suffered from Down's syndrome. 23 The court 
did not mention the general rule,24 followed in New Jersey,25 that 
a physical injury must accompany a claim for mental or emotional 
distress damages. 
The court summarily dispensed with the claim for costs to 
raise and to educate Sharon. The court contended that it would be 
unfair to saddle the doctors with the tremendous expenses to raise 
and to educate Sharon when the parents were going to retain all 
the benefits of the birth of a child. These benefits, according to the 
court, were the love and joy the Bermans would experience in rais­
ing Sharon. 26 
This casenote analyzes the damages recoverable in wrongful 
birth actions. The focus is on the two types of damages sought in 
Berman. First, the alleged damages to raise and to educate Sharon 
are examined to show that a denial of these damages was improper. 
Second, the allowance of damages for emotional and mental dis­
tress are analyzed as a proper award. Finally, the potential conse­
quences of awarding damages against negligent doctors are evalu­
ated to show that any hardship on the doctors does not outweigh 
the liberalization of damages in wrongful birth actions. 
20. Id. at 432,404 A.2d at 14. 
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
22. 80 N.J. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13. 
23. Id. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14. 
24. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 328-29 (4th ed. 1971). 
25. See Lemaldi v. De Tomaso of America, Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d 
1220 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), wherein plaintiff purchased an expensive sports car 
that never worked properly. The repairs on the car amounted to $4,000. Plaintiff 
brought suit to recover the $4,000 plus associated mental anguish damages. The 
court said the mental anguish would be compensable provided an adequate showing 
of a resulting physical injury was made. 
26. 80 N.J. at 432,404 A.2d at 14. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The New Jersey Supreme Court first considered wrongful 
birth twelve years prior to Berman in Gleitman. In Gleitman, a 
mother contracted German measles during pregnancy, and the 
treating physician allegedly neglected to tell her that her child 
could be born with birth defects as a result. 27 When the child was 
born with sight, hearing and speech impairments, the mother 
sought damages for emotional distress, and the father sought dam­
ages for the costs of raising the child. 28 The parents alleged that if 
the doctor had warned them of the possibility of having a child 
with birth defects, they would have obtained an abortion. 29 The 
court reasoned that the intangible benefits of parenthood had to be 
weighed against the emotional and monetary damages suffered by 
the parents to determine a compensatory award. The court ruled 
that it was nearly impossible to weigh the love and joy of parent­
hood; and, therefore, no damages were awardable. 30 The court 
then balanced the right of the fetus to be born against the parents' 
right to obtain an abortion, and thereby to avoid mental distress 
and monetary damages. Relying on the authority of Gulliver's 
Travels and Other Writings by Jonathan Swift, the court concluded 
that even if damages could be ascertained, the preciousness of hu­
man life outweighed any damages suffered by the parents. 31 Based 
on this analysis, Gleitman determined that wrongful birth was not a 
valid cause of action. 32 
The New Jersey Supreme Court confronted the issue of 
wrongful birth a second time in Berman. During the intervening 
years between Gleitman and Berman, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Roe, decided that a woman had a constitutional right to 
obtain an abortion. 33 The court held that this right was within the 
constitutional right of privacy; therefore, any state limitation or 
regulation of it was unconstitutional absent compelling state in­
terests. 34 Relying on Roe, the Berman court concluded that the ar­
guments of Gleitman could no longer block recovery. 35 
27. 49 N.J. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690. 
28. Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690. 
29. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691. 
30. Id. at 29-30, 227 A.2d at 693. 
31. Id. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693. 
32. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. 
33. 410 U.S. at 113. 
34. Id. at 155-56. 
35. 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14. 
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The recognition of wrongful birth in Berman brings New Jer­
sey within the majority of decisions that has allowed damages 
in cases in which the negligence of the doctor has resulted in a de­
nial of the right to obtain an abortion. 36 Although the majority of 
decisions has allowed recovery, there is disagreement as to the 
proper measure of damages. 37 New York state courts have dis­
36. See Gildner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 
1978) (doctor performed amniocentesis and assured the parents that their child 
would not be born with Tay-Sachs disease, the child was born with the disease, and 
the court allowed damages for the medical expenses and the pain and suffering due 
to the birth of the child); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (consolidation of two cases on appeal). In Becker the doctor 
failed to warn of the possibility that an abnormal child could be born. [d. at 406, 386 
N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97. He also failed to tell the parents of the exist­
ence of amniocentesis. [d. at 406,386 N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. As a result, 
a retarded child was born and the parents sought recovery due to the doctor's negli­
gence. [d. at 406, 386 N.E.2d 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. In Park v. Chessin (the case 
consolidated with Becker) the doctor negligently advised the parents to have a child 
despite the chance of birth defects. [d. at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 
897. In both cases the court permitted a cause of action for recovery of the costs of 
caring for the child. [d. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03; Karl­
sons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977) (doctor was negli­
gent in not telling the parents of the possibility that their child could be deformed 
or that amniocentesis could be used, a deformed child was born, a cause of action was 
allowed to recover for the parents' pain, suffering, and mental anguish subject to an 
offset for any benefits from raising the child); Ziemba v. Sterberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 
230,357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. 1974) (doctor was negligent in not telling the mother she 
was pregnant before she could have had an abortion, and consequently a healthy 
baby was born; the court established a cause of action if the doctor's negligence is 
established as the proximate cause of the birth, the mother can recover costs of rais­
ing the child, the costs of the birth, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium); Ja­
cobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1975) (doctor failed to diagnose the 
mother's condition as rubella, and therefore, failed to warn that her disease could 
cause birth defects, the child was born with birth defects, the court established a 
cause of action if the mother would have obtained an abortion, and recovery could 
be had for the amount necessary to treat and care for the physical impairment of the 
child); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (doctor, 
unaware of the pregnancy, failed to diagnose the mother's condition as rubella, the 
court permitted a cause of action if the parents could prove the doctor was negligent, 
they would have aborted the pregnancy and limited damages to the cost difference 
between raising a normal child and their child who was born with birth defects). But 
see Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (doc­
tor did not take a proper genealogical history and did not inform the parents of the 
possibility that the child could be born with Tay-Sachs disease or of the availability 
of tests to detect the disease in the fetus, the child died from Tay-Sachs and the par­
ents sued for negligence seeking damages only for their mental and emotional dis­
tress which the court held were not recoverable); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 
Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (doctor failed to diagnose pregnancy in time for 
an abortion, a healthy child was born and the parents sought and were denied dam­
ages equal to the costs of raising the child). 
37. See note 36 supra. 
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agreed among themselves about what the recovery should be, vary­
ing from granting no damages to allowing the costs to raise and to 
educate the child in addition to compensating for any mental dis­
tress suffered by the parents.38 Although the most recent New 
York Court of Appeals decision 39 denied mental distress damages, 
it did not formally overrule prior cases that allowed these damages. 
The decision in Berman to allow mental distress damages repre­
sents a minority view. 40 
The remedy that should be awarded in Berman can be analo­
gized to the remedy granted in a line of cases involving the negli­
gent performance of sterilizations and abortions resulting in the 
birth of unwanted children. The majority of these cases has allowed 
recovery, 41 but again, there is disagreement over what is the 
38. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 40, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) 
(care and treatment costs allowed); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109,366 N.E.2d 64, 
397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (no recovery allowed); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 
73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977) (pain and suffering and mental anguish compensa­
ble); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. 1974) (costs 
to raise healthy child and pain and suffering). 
39. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 40, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978). 
40. See 'Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977) 
(the only other case allowing recovery for mental distress). 
41. See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (doctor 
performed a negligent abortion which resulted in the birth of a healthy baby, the 
court held the mother could recover all damages flowing from the negligence under 
ordinary tort principles and the doctor could prove an offset in accordance with miti­
gation of damages requirements); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 463 (1967) (a negligent sterilization resulted in the birth of an unwanted child, 
the court held all damages that reasonably flowed from the negligence, including the 
costs to raise the child, were recoverable); Anonymous v. Hosp., 35 Conn. Supp. 112, 
398 A.2d 312 (1979) and Anonymous v. Hosp., 33 Conn. Supp. 112, 366 A.2d 204 
(1976) (unsuccessful tubal ligation was performed and birth of an unplanned child 
resulted, recovery was allowed for the costs of raising each child, but the defendant­
doctor could argue the joys of having a child as mitigation of damages); Coleman v. 
Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975) (improperly performed tubal ligation re­
sulted in the birth of a healthy child, the court permitted no damages for raising and 
educating the child citing the benefits of parenthood and only permitted damages for 
the cost of the tubal ligation, the cost of the pregnancy and the loss of the husband's 
consortium during and immediately following the pregnancy, however no recovery 
was allowed since the parents failed to meet their burden of proof); Bushman v. 
Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978) (child was 
born following a negligent vasectomy, damages were allowed for pain and suffering 
of the mother during pregnancy, the cost of the vasectomy, the loss of consortium 
and the medical expenses due to the pregnancy); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 
545,265 N.W.2d 411 (1978) (doctor failed to perform a tubal ligation and a child was 
born, recovery was allowed for mental anguish, on a negligence theory, and the costs 
to raise the child were allowed on a contract theory); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 
240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (pharmacist misfilled an oral contraceptive prescription 
and a healthy child was born, the court allowed damages, as balanced against the 
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proper measure of damages. The recovery allowed has varied from 
the costs of the negligent sterilization, the costs of pregnancy and 
the loss of consortium to the husband,42 to the costs of raising the 
child, . plus all other damages that reasonably flowed from the doc­
tor's negligence. 43 · . 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Damages to Raise and to Educate 
Cases such as Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic44 and Troppi v. 
Scarf45 indicate judicial reluctance to awarcldamages associated 
with the birth of a child. Utilizing the same reasoning as Sherlock 
and Troppi, the Berman court limited damages by weighing the 
love and joy experienced as parents against the unexpected but 
substantial economic and social burdens of rearing a mongoloid 
child. 46 Although Berman does not explicitly refer to the source of 
benefits of having a child, for the mother's lost wages, medical and hospital ex­
penses, pain and anxiety of pregnancy and childbirth and the costs to raise the 
child); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.w.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (negligent sterili­
zation resulted in a healthy baby, damages were allowed for prenatal and postnatal 
medical expenses, the mother's pain and suffering, loss of consortium and the costs 
of rearing the child to the age of majority as offset by the value of the child's comfort 
and society to the parents during their life expectancy); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 
N.}. Super. 369, 344 A.2d 336 (1975) (negligent sterilization operation resulted in 
birth of a healthy child, the court allowed recovery for the cost of the operation, 
emotional distress and for the costs of raising the child, less the benefits of raising 
the child); Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) 
(child was born following a negligent tubal ligation, recovery was allowed only for 
the cost of the unsuccessful operation and the pain and suffering associated with that 
operation); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978) 
(healthy baby was born as a result of negligent sterilization, the costs to raise the 
unwanted, but healthy, child were recoverable along with the medical expenses and 
the pain and suffering incident to the birth); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 
356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (an unsuccessful tubal ligation resulted in the birth of twins, 
the court upheld a $450,000 award to the mother based on ordinary negligence 
theory and an award of $12,500 to the husband for loss of consortium); Speck v. 
Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (crippled child was born after an 
unsuccessful vasectomy and abortion; parents could only recover past and future pe­
cuniary expenses associated with the care and raising of the child). But see Terrel v. 
Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1973) (doctor performed unsuccessful tubal ligation, 
and as a result a healthy baby was born, the parents sued the doctor for negligence 
seeking only damages to raise and educate the child; the court, relying on public pol­
icy, held no recovery as a matter of law because the benefits of a healthy child out­
weighed any damages). 
42. See Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
43. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). 
44. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977). 
45. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). 
46. 80 N.J. at 432,404 A.2d at 14. 
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its weighing formula, the formula derives from the "benefits rule" 
from the Restatement of TortS: 47 "Where the defendant's tortious 
conduct has caused harm to· the plaintiff or to his property and in 
so doing has conferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the in­
terest which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is con­
sidered in mitigation of damages, where it is equitable. 48 
Although courts have explicitly used the benefits rule to limit 
recovery,49 the California Court of Appeal, in Custodio v. Bauer, 50 
was critical of its application. In Custodio, a negligently performed 
sterilization resulted in the birth of a healthy child, and the court 
allowed recovery of the costs to raise and to educate the child. The 
court found that the joys of an unwanted child did not outweigh 
the economic expenses. Consequently, the benefits rule was inap­
plicable since economic costs to raise the unwanted child could de­
tract from the other family members' share of the total family in­
come. 51 
The benefits rule has b~en improperly applied in wrongful 
birth cases. A benefit conferred on the plaintiff by the defendant's 
negligent conduct should only offset the defendant's liability if 
there is a direct and recognizable benefit to the interest to be pro­
tected. 52 In Berman, the constitutional right to choose an abortion 
without interference was the right that was violated. The joys of 
raising Sharon do not have any relationship to, nor' do they miti­
gate, the denial of the Bermans' constitutional right. The minimiza­
tion of damages in Berman by weighing the joys and benefits of 
parenting against the concrete costs of rearing a child directly con­
flicts with the underlying basis of tort law which is to compensate 
the victim for damages he or she has suffered. 53 If the benefits of 
47. Id. at 433,404 A.2d at 14. Berman relied on Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 
8 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975), to support its balancing approach. Coleman specifically relied 
on the benefits rule of torts in determining that the value of a newborn child out­
weighs a claim for the expenses to raise and educate the child, 349 A.2d at 13-14; 
See also Troppi v. Scarf, 311 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. 
Stillwater, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (benefits rule used to limit recovery). 
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977). 
49. See Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 112, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); 
Coleman v. Garrison, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Troppi v. Scarf, 
31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 
169 (Minn. 1977). 
50. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). See also Stills v. Gratton, 55 
Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (benefits rule criticized). 
51. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967). 
52. Id.; Maben v. Rankin, 55 Cal. 2d 139, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353, 358 P.2d 681 (1961). 
53. W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at §§ 2 & 7, at 7 & 28. 
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having a child are allowed to be offset against the parents' mone­
tary damages, then the parents are left with an economic and social 
burden they did not want; and the doctor whose negligence caused 
the parents' burden is left in a position of having to pay only a 
portion of the damages his negligence caused. In some cases, the 
benefits may be found to equal or to exceed the monetary damages 
with the result that the doctor incurs no liability. Such a method of 
determining damages does not compensate the parents for their in­
juries. 
A determination of the reasonable costs to raise Sharon can be 
based on an estimation of the costs of shelter, food, and clothing 
required to bring up a child. Costs for a minor child to attend pri­
vate school54 and future expenses for college may also be recovera­
ble in appropriate cases. 55 Determinations of the costs to raise a 
child are routinely performed in child support cases, and the same 
procedure could be utilized in wrongful birth cases. In Rivera v. 
State ,56 which involved the birth of an unwanted child due to a 
negligently performed sterilization, the court determined that the 
economic costs to raise a child were routinely ascertainable. The 
court said: "Such calculations are made by estate planners, insur­
ance companies, and sometimes by private parties as incident to 
support proceedings or matrimonial settlements. "57 Rather than 
following rigid or mathematical formulations to establish costs, the 
common practice in child support cases is to allow the trial judge 
discretion to determine the value of these costs in accordance with 
the economic level to which the family is accustomed. 58 This gen­
eral practice is followed in child support cases in New Jersey 
where the trial judge is given the discretion to determine what is 
reasonable and just support on a case by case basis. 59 This same 
routine practice could be utilized at the trial level in wrongful birth 
cases. 
54. Smith v. Smith, 337 F. Supp. 475 (D. V.l. 1972) (a child support proceeding 
in which the husband was required to pay the expenses for a minor child to attend a 
private school). 
55. Thaler v. Klein, 55 App. Div. 2d 606, 389 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. 1976) (a child 
support proceeding in which it was found proper for the husband to pay the full 
costs of college education for his two daughters). 
56. See note 41 supra, 94 Misc. 2d 157,404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978). 
57. Id. at 161, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 953. 
58. Phillips v. Phillips, 344 So. 2d 786, (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Ducote v. 
Ducote, 339 So. 2d 835 (La. 1976); Mathews v. Mathews, 42 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 356 
N.E.2d 1083 (1976). 
59. Gordon v. Gordon, 147 N.J. Super. 585,371 A.2d 791 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1977). 
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In Berman, however, the cost of raising a normal child should 
be offset against the costs of raising Sharon, who suffers from 
Down's syndrome. Since the parents had desired to give birth to 
and to raise a normal child, only the extra costs associated with 
raising and caring for for a child born with birth defects should be 
recoverable. Several courts have followed this reasoning. 60 
B. Emotional and Mental Distress Damages 
Berman found the emotional and mental distress suffered by 
the Bermans as a result of giving birth to a mongoloid child to be 
concrete damages that were compensable. 61 In making this deter­
mination, the court never discussed, nor did it require, an accom­
panying physical injury. 
It is axiomatic in tort law that "[ w ]here the defendants' negli­
gence causes only mental disturbance, without accompanying phys­
ical injury or physical consequences, or any other independent ba­
sis for tort liability, there is still general agreement that in the 
ordinary case there can be no recovery. "62 The purpose of this rule 
is to insure that the mental injury is real. 63 Nevertheless, if it can 
clearly be established that serious mental distress can result with­
out physical harm, and there is a sufficient guarantee that the al­
leged mental distress is valid, then the lack of an accompanying 
physical injury should not bar recovery.64 Berman falls within the 
exception to the general rule since the birth of a monogoloid child 
will cause the parents mental and emotional anguish. 65 
The court did not discuss the Significance of its conclusion that 
damages were being allowed for mental and emotional distress 
without a requirement of an accompanying physical injury. The au­
thorities cited in Berman to support the allowance of mental dis­
tress damages all required a physical injury of some sort in addition 
to the claimed mental or emotional distress. 66 Although the court 
60. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's 
Hosp., 66 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). In both Jacobs and Dumer the doc­
tor's negligence denied the mother an opportunity to obtain an abortion and a child 
was born with birth defects. The courts found that public policy did not bar recovery 
of the extra costs to raise these children and to treat their handicaps. . 
61. 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14. 
62. See W. PROSSER, supra note 24. But see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 
Cal. Rptr. 72,441 P.2d 912 (1968) (the minority trend of allowing recovery of mental 
distress damages without a showing of an accompanying physical injury). 
63. See W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 329-30. 
64. [d. 
65. 80 N.J. at 438-39, 404 A.2d at 17-18 (Handler, J., concurring). 
66. Zahorian v. Russell Pitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 309 A.2d 754 
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deviated from this general rule with regard to recovery of mental 
distress damages without ever alluding to it, the award was proper; 
several courts have allowed similar recovery. 67 
C. The Consequences of a Liberalization of Damages 
It is conceivable that a liberalization of damages recoverable in 
wrongful birth suits will result in an explosion of litigation. 68 The 
jurisdictions that currently allow wrongful birth actions, however, 
have not had their courts jammed with litigation. 69 Even if the 
floodgates were opened by allowing more substantial recovery, that 
would not be a valid reason to restrict damages. "[T]he fear of an 
expansion of litigation should not deter courts from granting relief 
in meritorious cases; the proper remedy is an expansion of the ju­
dicial machinery, not a decrease in the availability of justice. "70 
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that wrongful birth actions 
should not be singled out for a limitation of recovery.71 The court 
(1973) (single, young woman after being denied an apartment rental due to her age 
and marital status became extremely upset necessitating several visits to her doctor, 
the court allowed her damages for her emotional upset in a suit claiming violation of 
the woman's civil rights); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) (plaintiff 
sought damages resulting from fright when a car passed close to plaintiff and made 
her fearful of being hit, the court allowed recovery in this case for bodily injury or 
sickness proximately resulti'ng from the fright); Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical 
Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153 N.J. Super. 79, 370 A.2d 76 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1977) (parents suffered emotional and mental distress as a consequence of the 
method used to tell the mother of the death of her baby and the failure to locate the 
baby or confirm its death for three weeks, although unclear, this case seems to follow 
the general rule that a physical injury must result from the emotional upset to allow 
recovery); Lemaldi v. DeTomaso of America, Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d 
1220 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). See also note 25 supra and accompanying text; W. 
PROSSER, supra note 24, § 54, at 327-35. The general rule is that mental distress dam­
ages are not recoverable alone. A physical injury must accompany the mental distress 
so that it is clear that the mental distress claim is not fraudulent. 
67. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Law 
Div. 1975); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977). 
See also text accompanying notes 36 & 41 supra. 
68. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) 
(court held that if allowance of recovery would open the floodgates, public policy al­
lowed a denial of recovery). 
69. Currently, of all the jurisdictions that allow wrongful birth actions, New 
York has the most reported cases. To date only seven cases have been reported. 
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); 
Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977); Karlsons 
v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 
45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. 1974); Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 
391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 
950 (N.Y. Ct. CI. 1978). 
70. Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559,214 A.2d 12 (1965). 
71. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). 
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said that the right to obtain an abortion has become a constitu­
tionally guaranteed right; therefore, any attempt to limit damages 
would be an infringement of this right. 72 This court, along with 
others,73 has held that damages in a negligence action should not be 
limited simply because the suit concerns the birth of a child. 
Although these damages may result in a substantial burden on 
a doctor whose negligence causes an unwanted birth, a doctor 
should not be automatically immunized from the consequences of 
his negligence. To limit the doctor's liability simply because recov­
ery would be large is unfair since the alternative would be that the 
innocent victims of the negligence then would have to bear sub­
stantial costs. Additionally, if the doctor is held liable for his negli­
gence, he will have an incentive to act in a nonnegligent manner. 74 
The consequences of increased liability may directly affect the 
expense and availability of certain medical services provided by 
doctors. Doctors could refuse to perform amniocentesis or to give 
prenatal advice. Rather than abandon this medical service, how­
ever, the medical profession may be willing to pay increased mal­
practice premiums and then to pass its increased costs to the 
general public. If this occurred, the Berman court's concern for 
overburdening the doctor75 would not be valid since the public at 
large would, in effect, absorb the liability. Although it might seem 
unfair for the general public to subsidize medical negligence by an 
increase in medical bills, it is more unjustifiable to saddle the inno­
cent victims of the negligence with the substantial costs. Such po­
tential consequences are still not adequate reasons to restrict re­
covery when a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion 
has been infringed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Berman decision brings New Jersey up-to-date by its rec­
ognizing wrongful birth as a valid cause of action in tort. The deci­
sion followed the pattern of other jurisdictions limiting recoverable 
damages. Berman limited recovery by not recognizing monetary 
damages for rearing a mongoloid child. Other jurisdictions have 
limited damages by stating that the joys and benefits of parenthood 
partially offset or, in some cases, outweigh any recovery. 
72. Id. at 46,356 N.E.2d at 499. 
73. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Rivera 
v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157,404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. Ct. CI. 1978). 
74. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1963); 80 N.J. at 
436-37,404 A.2d at 16 (Handler, J., concurring). 
75. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14. 
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The recognition by the United States Supreme Court of a 
woman's constitutional right to an abortion clearly represents a 
shift in public policy from prior opposition to abortion. Conse­
quently, courts should not readily reduce compensatory damages in 
wrongful birth actions simply because the birth of a child is in­
volved. If a doctor negligently performs his job and damages re­
sult, he should be fully liable. Otherwise, a doctor may not have 
an adequate incentive to act in a non negligent manner. 
The limitation of damages in Bennan is based on the benefits 
rule of tort law. The court balanced the joys of parenthood against 
the monetary costs of raising a mongoloid child. This application of 
the benefits rule is improper since the interest protected in this 
case, the right to choose an abortion, is not benefited by the doc­
tors' negligence. Therefore, the extra monetary costs associated 
with raising a mongoloid child should be recoverable. The costs of 
raising a child are routinely determined in child support cases, and 
a similar determination could be made in wrongful birth cases. 
The allowance of mental and emotional distress damages in 
Bennan was a proper award despite the failure to require an ac­
companying physical injury. Generally, a physical injury is re­
quired to validate the mental and emotional injury. In this case, 
the alleged mental and emotional injury is recognizable and com­
pensable; and therefore, validation is not required. 
Increased damages in wrongful birth actions could result in 
higher medical malpractice premiums which would be passed on to 
the general public. Although this would mean higher medical costs 
for everyone, this is preferable to burdening the innocent victims 
of the doctor's negligence with the substantial economic costs of 
raising an unwanted child. 
Liberalized damages could potentially open the floodgates to 
wrongful birth litigation although this has not happened in the ju­
risdictions that have allowed these actions. Even if the floodgates 
were opened, that is not a valid reason to deny recovery in merito­
rious cases. Where a woman's constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion has been infringed by a doctor's negligence, there is a rec­
ognizable injury which should be deterred and remedied. 
Andrew Rodau 
